Husserl's Method: Noesis and Noema

Theories of mental representation mostly ask what a state represents: its content, and what makes that content about one thing rather than another (Jacob 2023). They say less about something just as basic. The same thing can be represented in very different ways, and the differences are part of the experience, not extras added on top of it.

Take a house you know well. You can see it from the street, with its front lit and its back out of view. You can remember it as it was when you were a child, with the fence that's since been torn down. You can imagine it after a renovation, with windows it's never had. In all three cases, you're directed at the same house. Yet the three experiences differ in ways any theory of mind has to capture:

• The kind of act differs. Perceiving, remembering, and imagining are different ways of being directed.
• The house is meant differently. It's meant as seen from here, as it was then, and as it might be.
• Its standing differs. The house is given as present, as past, and as merely possible, and you take it as real, as having been real, and as not real at all.

Research on perception, memory, and mental imagery often studies each of these modes separately. Comparing them requires a vocabulary that names what they share and how they differ, without assuming in advance that memory is faded perception or imagery is weak seeing.

A theory that tracks only what a state is about treats these three experiences as the same, because all three are about the same house. A theory that tracks only the inner state loses the fact that the house is the common object. Edmund Husserl's analysis of the intentional act into two sides was built to keep both in view (Husserl [1913] 2014, §§87–96). The noesis is the act of meaning. The noema is the object as meant.

This vocabulary is useful well beyond Husserl scholarship. It gives you a way to describe the structure of any conscious state, whether perception, memory, imagination, expectation, or judgment, without collapsing it into its object or into a private inner item. The concept at its center, the noema, is also the subject of one of phenomenology's longest-running debates. That debate turns on whether phenomenology is a theory of mental representation at all.

If your work touches perception, memory, imagery, or the content of mental states, you'll find distinctions here that current debates often need and seldom draw sharply. The analysis begins with a simple observation: one object can be meant in many ways.

References

• Husserl, Edmund. (1913) 2014. Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. Translated by Daniel O. Dahlstrom. Indianapolis: Hackett.
  • Free: None. Cite by section (§), which is stable across translations.
  • Publisher: Hackett · alternative translation: Kersten (Springer)
  • Free companion: SEP, "Edmund Husserl" (Zahavi), §3
• Jacob, Pierre. 2023. "Intentionality." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman. https\://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/.

Introduction

To analyze an intentional act, you need to say both what kind of act it is and what it's directed at, and how. Husserl's Logical Investigations gives a first vocabulary for this. His Ideas I adds an account of how perception gives its object: never all at once.

This reading explains act quality and act matter, and perception through adumbrations. Citations to the Logical Investigations give the Investigation and section ("Inv. V, §20"). Citations to Ideas I give the section number (§).

Act Quality and Act Matter

In the Fifth Logical Investigation, Husserl distinguishes two components in every intentional act (Husserl [1900–1901] 2001, Inv. V, §20).

Act quality is the kind of act: presenting, judging, wishing, asking, doubting. It settles whether the act merely presents its object, asserts something about it, or wants it.

Act matter is what gives the act its direction to this object, and fixes as what the object is meant. It settles which object the act is about and under what description.

The two vary independently.

• Same matter, different quality. Judging that it will rain tomorrow, wishing that it will rain tomorrow, and asking whether it will rain tomorrow share one matter: rain tomorrow. They differ in quality.
• Same quality, different matter. Judging that the tallest building in town is closed and judging that the old bank tower is closed can be judgments about the same building. They differ in matter, because they mean the building as different things.

Husserl calls the unity of quality and matter the act's intentional essence (Inv. V, §21). Two acts with the same quality and matter mean the same thing in the same way, whoever performs them and whenever they occur.

Perception Through Adumbrations

Perception has a feature that judgment and wishing lack. Its object is given in intuition, as itself there. But a physical thing is never given all at once.

In Ideas I, Husserl describes how a perceived thing is given through adumbrations (Abschattungen). These are profiles or aspects that present the thing from one side at a time (Husserl [1913] 2014, §41). Walk around a table, and you see a continuous series of profiles. Each shows one side, from one angle, in one light. Throughout, you perceive one table.

Two points follow.

• The thing isn't any of its profiles. The table's shape looks different from each angle, and its color looks different in light and shade. Yet you perceive one shape and one color, which the changing profiles present.
• Perception is never complete. However many profiles you take in, more are always possible. The perceived thing always outruns what is given of it. Husserl calls this inadequate givenness: the thing is given, but never exhaustively.

Adumbration is a structural feature of perceiving physical things. It isn't a limitation of human eyesight. No perceiver, however acute, could see a table from all sides at once.

Conclusion

Act quality is the kind of act, and act matter fixes which object is meant and as what. Together they make up the act's intentional essence. Perception adds a further structure: its object is given through adumbrations, one profile at a time, and never completely.

Key Terms

• Act quality: In Husserl, the kind of intentional act, such as presenting, judging, wishing, or asking.
• Act matter: In Husserl, the component of an act that fixes which object it is directed at, and as what.
• Intentional essence: Husserl's term for the unity of an act's quality and matter.
• Adumbrations (Abschattungen): Profiles or aspects through which a perceived physical thing is given from one side at a time.
• Inadequate givenness: Givenness in which the object is truly given but never exhaustively, as in the perception of physical things.

References

• Husserl, Edmund. (1913) 2014. Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. Translated by Daniel O. Dahlstrom. Indianapolis: Hackett.
  • Free: None. Cite by section (§), which is stable across translations.
  • Publisher: Hackett · alternative translation: Kersten (Springer)
  • Free companion: SEP, "Edmund Husserl" (Zahavi), §3
• Husserl, Edmund. (1900–1901) 2001. Logical Investigations. 2 vols. Translated by J. N. Findlay. Edited by Dermot Moran. International Library of Philosophy. London: Routledge.
  • Free: No English translation; German first edition, vol. 1 (1900), Internet Archive
  • Publisher: Routledge, vol. 1 (Prolegomena) · Routledge, vol. 2 (Investigations V–VI)
  • Free companion: SEP, "Edmund Husserl" (Zahavi), §2 · IEP, "Husserl, Edmund" (Sawicki)

Introduction

Husserl's Ideas I (1913) recasts his earlier analysis of intentional acts in a new vocabulary: noesis and noema. The terms have become standard in phenomenology. They also sparked a long debate about what exactly the noema is.

This reading explains noesis and noema, the noematic sense, and how one object appears across different acts. Citations to Ideas I give the section number (§).

Two Sides of Every Act

Once attention is turned to how things are given, every intentional experience shows two correlated sides (Husserl [1913] 2014, §§87–96).

The noesis is the act side: the meaning-giving act of perceiving, remembering, imagining, or judging, with all the components that make it the act it is.

The noema is the object side: the object as meant, exactly as the act intends it. When you perceive a tree, the noema is the tree as perceived: from this side, in this light, as blossoming, as really there.

Husserl holds that noesis and noema correspond point for point. Every difference in the act shows up as a difference in how the object is meant, and every difference in how it's meant points back to a difference in the act.

The Noematic Sense

At the center of the noema is what Husserl calls the noematic sense (Sinn): the object "as" it's meant, meaning the determinations under which the act intends it (Husserl [1913] 2014, §§90–91). The tree as a blossoming apple tree seen from the left is one noematic sense. The tree as the one planted the year you were born is another.

Around the sense, the noema includes characters that mark the object's mode of givenness and standing. The object may be meant as perceived, remembered, or imagined. It may be taken as certain, as doubtful, or as merely possible (Spear n.d.).

A useful test for picking out the noema is the "as" phrase: the tree as seen from here, the tree as it was that summer, the tree as it might look in snow. What follows "as" describes the object as meant.

One Object, Three Acts

The last row stays the same across all three acts, while everything above it changes. That's the point of the analysis. One object can be meant in many ways, and each way has a noetic side and a noematic side.

What the Noema Isn't

On any reading, the noema isn't a mental picture of the object. It isn't a real (reell) component of the experience, the way a sensation or the act itself is (Spear n.d.). Husserl describes it as the intentional correlate of the act.

Beyond that, what the noema is has been sharply disputed. It might be an abstract sense through which the object is meant. Or it might be the object itself, considered just as it's meant. Both readings have strong defenders.

Conclusion

The noesis is the act of meaning, and the noema is the object as meant. At the core of the noema is the noematic sense, the object "as" it's intended, surrounded by characters of mode and standing. One object can be the target of many noeses, each with its own noema. What kind of entity the noema is remains an open question.

Key Terms

• Noesis: The act side of an intentional experience: the meaning-giving act of perceiving, remembering, imagining, or judging.
• Noema: The object side of an intentional experience: the object as meant, exactly as the act intends it.
• Noematic sense (Sinn): The core of the noema: the object "as" it's meant, meaning the determinations under which the act intends it.
• Real (reell) component: A part of the experience itself, such as a sensation or the act, as opposed to the intentional correlate it's directed at.

References

• Husserl, Edmund. (1913) 2014. Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. Translated by Daniel O. Dahlstrom. Indianapolis: Hackett.
  • Free: None. Cite by section (§), which is stable across translations.
  • Publisher: Hackett · alternative translation: Kersten (Springer)
  • Free companion: SEP, "Edmund Husserl" (Zahavi), §3
• Spear, Andrew D. n.d. "Husserl, Edmund: Intentionality and Intentional Content." Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https\://iep.utm.edu/huss-int/.

Introduction

In 1969, Dagfinn Føllesdal published an eight-page article on the noema that set the terms of a debate lasting decades. His reading tied Husserl to Gottlob Frege's theory of meaning. It made phenomenology look like a theory of mental representation, which helped bring it into conversation with analytic philosophy and cognitive science.

This reading explains the Fregean reading of the noema, its main defenders, and what it implies about phenomenology.

What Needs Explaining

In Husserl's analysis, every intentional act has a noema: the object as meant, exactly as the act intends it (Husserl [1913] 2014, §§87–96). At its core is the noematic sense: the object "as" it's meant, meaning the determinations under which the act intends it.

The debate concerns what kind of thing the noema is. Is it something distinct from the object, through which the object is meant? Or is it the object itself, considered just as it's meant?

Føllesdal's Proposal

Føllesdal argued that the noema is a generalization of Frege's notion of sense (Sinn) (Føllesdal 1969). For Frege, a linguistic expression has a sense, a mode of presentation, through which it refers to an object. "The morning star" and "the evening star" have different senses but refer to the same planet (Frege [1892] 1960). Føllesdal proposed that Husserl extended this idea from language to every intentional act.

On this Fregean reading, the noema has three key features:

• It's an intensional entity, an abstract sense, not a physical thing and not a mental event.
• The act is directed at its object by way of the noema. The noema mediates between act and object, as a sense mediates between an expression and its referent.
• The noema isn't perceived by the senses. It's grasped only in phenomenological reflection.

The reading explains why two acts can have the same object under different senses, and why an act can have a sense even when no object exists. It does so in terms familiar from the philosophy of language.

Dreyfus and Smith and McIntyre

In 1982, two books developed the reading.

Hubert Dreyfus edited Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science, which brought the Fregean reading into contact with cognitive science (Dreyfus 1982). Dreyfus presented Husserl as a forerunner of the representational theory of mind behind much cognitive science and artificial intelligence research. He was also sharply critical of that tradition, and he used the Fregean Husserl partly as a foil.

David Woodruff Smith and Ronald McIntyre gave the reading its most systematic development in Husserl and Intentionality (Smith and McIntyre 1982). They treated the noematic sense as the content that determines which object an act is about. They then connected Husserl's theory to contemporary work on meaning and reference.

What the Reading Implies

The Fregean reading has a large consequence. It makes phenomenology a theory of mental representation: the view that the mind is directed at objects by way of contents that stand between it and the world. On this picture, the noema plays the role that "content" plays in current philosophy of mind.

Its defenders count this as a strength, because it lets phenomenology speak directly to analytic philosophy and cognitive science. Its critics see it as a distortion. On their view, Husserl's phenomenology describes objects as they appear, and doesn't posit entities that stand between the mind and the world.

Conclusion

The Fregean reading, launched by Føllesdal and developed by Dreyfus and by Smith and McIntyre, treats the noema as an abstract sense through which an act is directed at its object. It makes phenomenology a theory of mental representation. Whether that's a faithful reading of Husserl is the question the rival reading presses.

Key Terms

• Noema: The object side of an intentional experience: the object as meant, exactly as the act intends it.
• Noematic sense (Sinn): The core of the noema: the object "as" it's meant, meaning the determinations under which the act intends it.
• Fregean reading: The interpretation on which the noema is an abstract sense, generalized from Frege's theory of meaning, through which an act is directed at its object.
• Mental representation: The view that the mind is directed at objects by way of contents that stand between it and the world.

References

• Dreyfus, Hubert L., ed., with Harrison Hall. 1982. Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • Free: None.
  • Publisher: MIT Press
  • Free companion: IEP, "Husserl, Edmund: Intentionality and Intentional Content" (Spear)
• Føllesdal, Dagfinn. 1969. "Husserl's Notion of Noema." Journal of Philosophy 66 (20): 680–87.
  • Free: None.
  • Publisher: doi:10.2307/2024451
  • Free companion: IEP, "Husserl, Edmund: Intentionality and Intentional Content" (Spear)
• Frege, Gottlob. (1892) 1960. "On Sense and Reference." Translated by Max Black. In Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, edited by Peter Geach and Max Black, 56–78. 2nd ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
• Husserl, Edmund. (1913) 2014. Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. Translated by Daniel O. Dahlstrom. Indianapolis: Hackett.
  • Free: None. Cite by section (§), which is stable across translations.
  • Publisher: Hackett · alternative translation: Kersten (Springer)
  • Free companion: SEP, "Edmund Husserl" (Zahavi), §3
• Smith, David Woodruff, and Ronald McIntyre. 1982. Husserl and Intentionality: A Study of Mind, Meaning, and Language. Synthese Library 154. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
  • Free: None.
  • Publisher: Springer

Introduction

The Fregean reading treats Husserl's noema as an abstract sense, generalized from Frege's theory of meaning (Frege [1892] 1960), through which an act is directed at its object. A second tradition of interpretation rejects the mediator. On this view, the noema is the object itself, considered just as it's meant. The choice between the two readings decides what kind of theory phenomenology is.

This reading explains the perceptual or object reading and its main defenders. It compares the two readings and ends with a list of further reading.

The Perceptual or Object Reading

On the perceptual reading, also called the object reading, the noema isn't a third thing standing between the act and its object. It's the object itself, taken just as it's intended and considered in reflection. In Husserl's analysis, the noema is the object as meant, exactly as the act intends it (Husserl [1913] 2014, §§87–96). The perceptual reading takes that phrase at face value: the tree as perceived is the tree, attended to in its being-perceived.

Three defenders stand out.

• Aron Gurwitsch developed the reading from the phenomenology of perception. For Gurwitsch, the perceptual noema is the perceived object just as it's perceived, organized as a whole in the field of consciousness. The thing itself is the systematic unity of all its possible appearances (Gurwitsch 1964).
• Robert Sokolowski argues that the noema is the object considered from the phenomenological attitude. It's not a separate entity but the same object, now reflected on as meant (Sokolowski 2000).
• John Drummond argues that the noema is the object as intended, and that treating it as an intermediary misreads Husserl. His reading supports a realism in which consciousness is directed at the world itself (Drummond 1990).

These positions differ in detail, and Gurwitsch's view is sometimes classified separately. They share the rejection of the noema as a mediating entity.

The Two Readings Compared

What Hangs on the Choice

The debate decides whether phenomenology is a theory of mental representation: the view that the mind is directed at objects by way of contents that stand between it and the world. On the Fregean reading, it is, and the noema plays the role of content. On the perceptual reading, it isn't. Phenomenology describes objects as they appear, and the noema is simply the object in its appearing.

Each reading has a hard case. The Fregean reading must explain how an abstract sense is present in perception, where objects seem to be given directly. The perceptual reading must explain acts directed at objects that don't exist, where there's no object to be the noema.

The free Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Husserl's theory of intentionality gives a balanced overview of both readings (Spear n.d.).

Conclusion

The perceptual reading, defended by Gurwitsch, Sokolowski, and Drummond, identifies the noema with the object as meant rather than with a mediating sense. The choice between the two readings decides whether phenomenology is a theory of mental representation or a theory of appearing. Neither reading has won general agreement.

Key Terms

• Fregean reading: The interpretation on which the noema is an abstract sense, generalized from Frege's theory of meaning, through which an act is directed at its object.
• Perceptual reading: The interpretation on which the noema is the object itself, considered just as it's meant, rather than a mediating sense. It's also called the object reading.
• Noema: The object side of an intentional experience: the object as meant, exactly as the act intends it.
• Mental representation: The view that the mind is directed at objects by way of contents that stand between it and the world.

References

• Dreyfus, Hubert L., ed., with Harrison Hall. 1982. Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • Free: None.
  • Publisher: MIT Press
  • Free companion: IEP, "Husserl, Edmund: Intentionality and Intentional Content" (Spear)
• Drummond, John J. 1990. Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism: Noema and Object. Contributions to Phenomenology 4. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
  • Free: None.
  • Publisher: Springer
• Føllesdal, Dagfinn. 1969. "Husserl's Notion of Noema." Journal of Philosophy 66 (20): 680–87.
  • Free: None.
  • Publisher: doi:10.2307/2024451
  • Free companion: IEP, "Husserl, Edmund: Intentionality and Intentional Content" (Spear)
• Frege, Gottlob. (1892) 1960. "On Sense and Reference." Translated by Max Black. In Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, edited by Peter Geach and Max Black, 56–78. 2nd ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
• Gurwitsch, Aron. 1964. The Field of Consciousness. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.
  • Free: None.
  • Publisher: in print as The Field of Consciousness: Theme, Thematic Field, and Margin, Collected Works of Aron Gurwitsch 3, edited by Richard M. Zaner (Springer, 2010) · library route: HathiTrust record (1964 ed.)
• Husserl, Edmund. (1913) 2014. Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. Translated by Daniel O. Dahlstrom. Indianapolis: Hackett.
  • Free: None. Cite by section (§), which is stable across translations.
  • Publisher: Hackett · alternative translation: Kersten (Springer)
  • Free companion: SEP, "Edmund Husserl" (Zahavi), §3
• Smith, David Woodruff, and Ronald McIntyre. 1982. Husserl and Intentionality: A Study of Mind, Meaning, and Language. Synthese Library 154. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
  • Free: None.
  • Publisher: Springer
• Sokolowski, Robert. 2000. Introduction to Phenomenology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Free: None.
  • Publisher: Cambridge University Press
  • Free companion: SEP, "Phenomenology" (Smith)
• Spear, Andrew D. n.d. "Husserl, Edmund: Intentionality and Intentional Content." Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https\://iep.utm.edu/huss-int/.

Introduction

Noesis and noema are easiest to grasp by using them. This walkthrough analyzes one object, a tree, across three acts: perceiving it, remembering it, and imagining it. Step by step, it separates the act side from the object side, identifies what stays the same and what changes, and ends with an annotated analysis table you can compare with your own.

The Starting Point

Here are three short descriptions of experiences directed at the same apple tree in a neighbor's yard.

A. From my kitchen window, I see the apple tree, its left side in sun, blossoms on the lower branches.

B. I remember the apple tree the summer it first fruited, the branches bent low with apples.

C. I imagine the apple tree in deep snow, its branches bare and white.

All three are about one tree. The analysis shows how they differ, using Husserl's two sides of the intentional act. The noesis is the act side. The noema is the object side: the object as meant (Husserl [1913] 2014, §§87–96).

Walking Through the Analysis

Step 1: Identify the act quality for each

Start on the noetic side, and ask what kind of act each description reports.

• A is a perceiving. The tree is given in intuition, as itself there now.
• B is a remembering. The tree is given again, as it was, by way of a re-presentation.
• C is an imagining. The tree is given as merely possible, as a fancy, without any claim that it is or was like this.

This is the difference in act quality: three kinds of act directed at one object.

Step 2: Describe the noematic sense for each

Now turn to the noematic side. For each act, describe the tree as meant. The "as" phrase helps (Spear n.d.):

• A: the tree as seen from here: from the kitchen window, left side sunlit, blossoming.
• B: the tree as it was that summer: first fruiting, branches heavy.
• C: the tree as it might look in snow: bare, white-laden.

Each is a different noematic sense: the object "as" it's meant, meaning the determinations under which the act intends it.

Step 3: Note what stays the same and what changes

Compare the three. What stays the same is the object meant: this apple tree in the neighbor's yard. What changes has three parts (Husserl [1913] 2014, §§90–91):

• The manner in which the tree is meant, meaning its noematic sense: sunlit and blossoming, heavy with fruit, snow-laden.
• The mode of belief. In A, the tree is taken as actually existing now. In B, it's taken as having existed so. In C, the question of existence is neutralized: the snowy tree is neither affirmed nor denied, only imagined.
• The temporal index. In A, the tree is given as present. In B, it's given as past. In C, it has no fixed place in real time at all.

This is the core of noetic-noematic analysis. One object stays constant across acts, while the act, the sense, the belief, and the time all vary together.

Step 4: Note the adumbrations in the perceptual case

Return to A. The perceived tree is given through adumbrations: profiles that present it from one side at a time. You see its left side from the kitchen window. Its far side, the trunk behind the leaves, and its roots aren't seen, but they're co-given as parts of the same tree (Husserl [1913] 2014, §41). Walk into the yard, and new profiles appear.

The other two acts don't give the tree in this way. The remembered tree and the imagined tree aren't given in profiles that could be enlarged by walking around. That difference is itself part of the noetic-noematic analysis.

Key Considerations

A common pitfall: treating the noema as a mental picture. It's tempting to think that when you imagine the snowy tree, the noema is a picture in your head. That's a mistake on either reading of the noema. The noema of act C is the tree as imagined, not an image of the tree. The same holds for memory. Remembering the tree isn't looking at an inner photograph of it.

Keep the sides distinct. "Perceiving," "remembering," and "imagining" describe the noesis. "As seen from here," "as it was that summer," and "as it might look in snow" describe the noema. Mixing them up, for example by calling the snowy tree "an imagining," blurs the analysis.

Belief isn't only in the act. The differences in belief (actual, having been, neutralized) appear on both sides. They are ways of positing on the noetic side, and characters of the object as meant on the noematic side. Husserl's parallelism means you can describe them from either direction.

Summary

The walkthrough identified the act quality of each experience and described its noematic sense. It then separated what stays the same (the object) from what changes (sense, belief, and time), and noted how perception gives its object through adumbrations. Here is an annotated analysis table to compare with your own:

1. The noetic side differs in kind in each column (Step 1).
2. Each "as" phrase describes the noema, not an inner picture (Step 2).
3. Belief and time vary together with the act (Step 3).
4. Only perception gives its object through adumbrations (Step 4).
5. The object stays constant, which is what makes this one object meant in three ways (Step 3).

References

• Husserl, Edmund. (1913) 2014. Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. Translated by Daniel O. Dahlstrom. Indianapolis: Hackett.
  • Free: None. Cite by section (§), which is stable across translations.
  • Publisher: Hackett · alternative translation: Kersten (Springer)
  • Free companion: SEP, "Edmund Husserl" (Zahavi), §3
• Spear, Andrew D. n.d. "Husserl, Edmund: Intentionality and Intentional Content." Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https\://iep.utm.edu/huss-int/.