Being-in-the-World: Mood, Understanding, and Care

Most accounts of emotion treat moods as inner states. You're anxious or cheerful, and that state then colors how you see things. The mood is in you. The world is out there, the same either way.

Everyday experience resists this picture. Walk down the same street on an anxious morning and on a carefree one. On the anxious morning, the traffic looks threatening, the crowd feels pressing, and every delay seems to count against you. On the carefree one, the same street is open and full of things worth noticing. Or take deep boredom, in which everything goes flat, and nothing seems worth doing or even worth looking at. In both cases, what changes isn't only a feeling inside you. It's how the whole world shows up: what stands out, what matters, and what seems possible.

Martin Heidegger built this observation into a philosophical claim (Heidegger [1927] 2008, §29). For him, moods aren't private additions to a neutral world. They're one of the basic ways a world is disclosed at all. Before we think about anything, we already find ourselves attuned, and it's through that attunement that things can matter to us.

The claim has a live research afterlife. The philosopher Matthew Ratcliffe draws on Heidegger to describe what he calls existential feelings (Ratcliffe 2008). These are bodily feelings that aren't directed at any particular object. They're ways of finding oneself in the world as a whole: a sense of belonging or estrangement, of things being real or unreal, of possibilities being open or closed. Ratcliffe argues that many psychiatric conditions involve changes in these feelings. A person with severe depression may report not just sadness, but a world in which nothing offers any possibility of significance. On his account, such reports describe a changed world, not only a changed inner state.

The research stakes are direct. Studies of affect in consciousness research and psychiatry often measure emotions as internal states with intensities and objects. That framing can miss the feelings that set the background against which anything feels any way at all. If moods disclose the world, then a questionnaire that asks only how you feel inside may be asking the wrong question.

Heidegger's analysis gives you a vocabulary for describing affect as world-disclosing rather than merely subjective. It lets you ask of any study of emotion what it takes a mood to be, and what its methods would miss if that assumption were wrong.

References

• Heidegger, Martin. (1927) 2008. Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. Harper Perennial Modern Thought. New York: Harper Perennial.
  • Free: None. Cite by section and German page (H.), which both English translations print in the margin.
  • Publisher: HarperCollins (Harper Perennial Modern Thought; ISBN 97800615755940 · alternative translation: SUNY Press (Stambaugh, rev. Schmidt)
  • Free companion: SEP, "Martin Heidegger" (Wrathall), §2 · IEP, "Heidegger, Martin"
• Ratcliffe, Matthew. 2008. Feelings of Being: Phenomenology, Psychiatry and the Sense of Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Free: None.
  • Publisher: Oxford University Press · Oxford Academic (institutional access)

Introduction

Philosophers have usually treated moods as the least reliable part of experience: subjective, fleeting, and in need of correction by reason. Heidegger argues the reverse. Moods disclose the world more basically than cognition does.

This reading explains attunement, thrownness, and Heidegger's two examples: fear, and the special case of anxiety. Citations to Being and Time give the section (§) and the German page (H.), which both English translations print in the margin.

Attunement and Mood

Heidegger's term is Befindlichkeit. It comes from the ordinary German question Wie befinden Sie sich?, "How are you doing?", literally "How do you find yourself?" Macquarrie and Robinson translate it as "state-of-mind," which suggests an inner state. Other translators prefer "attunement," used here.

Attunement (Befindlichkeit) is the basic way Dasein always already finds itself in some mood, which discloses how it is faring in the world (Heidegger [1927] 2008, §29, H. 134). A mood (Stimmung) is a particular way of being attuned: cheerful, bored, anxious, or the flat evenness of an ordinary day. Heidegger's point is that there's no mood-free condition. Even indifference is a mood.

Three claims define attunement.

1. Moods disclose thrownness. In a mood, Dasein is brought before the fact that it is, and has to be, without knowing where from or where to (§29, H. 134–35).
2. Moods disclose being-in-the-world as a whole. A mood isn't directed at one object. It's the way everything shows up together (§29, H. 137).
3. Moods make it possible for things to matter. Only because we're attuned can anything strike us as threatening, inviting, or dull (§29, H. 137).

Thrownness (Geworfenheit) is the fact that Dasein finds itself already delivered over to a situation it didn't choose and has to take up. It's the lived side of facticity. You didn't choose your language, your body, or your century, and your moods keep bringing that home.

Fear

Heidegger illustrates attunement with fear: a mood in which something within the world is encountered as threatening, as approaching and able to harm (§30, H. 140–42). He analyzes it in three respects.

The table shows fear's structure. Fear isn't a feeling added to a neutral perception of a dog. The fearing is how the dog shows up as a threat in the first place.

Anxiety

Anxiety (Angst), for Heidegger, is a mood that has no definite object, in which the world as such, as a whole, shows up as threatening and meaningless (§40, H. 184–91). Fear is always of something in the world. In anxiety, nothing in particular threatens. The everyday significance of things falls away, and what's disclosed is the world as such, and Dasein's own being-in-the-world.

Heidegger calls the result uncanniness (Unheimlichkeit), literally "not-being-at-home" (§40, H. 188–89). In anxiety, the familiar world no longer holds us, and we're thrown back on our own being and its possibilities. That's why anxiety has a special place in his analysis. It discloses what everyday life usually covers over.

Conclusion

For Heidegger, attunement is the basic way Dasein finds itself in a mood. Moods disclose thrownness, disclose being-in-the-world as a whole, and let things matter. Fear discloses something definite in the world as threatening. Anxiety has no definite object and discloses the world as such.

Key Terms

• Attunement (Befindlichkeit): In Heidegger, the basic way Dasein always already finds itself in some mood, which discloses how it is faring in the world. Macquarrie and Robinson translate it as "state-of-mind."
• Mood (Stimmung): In Heidegger, a particular way of being attuned, such as cheerfulness, boredom, or anxiety.
• Thrownness (Geworfenheit): In Heidegger, the fact that Dasein finds itself already delivered over to a situation it didn't choose and has to take up.
• Fear: In Heidegger, a mood in which something within the world is encountered as threatening, as approaching and able to harm.
• Anxiety (Angst): In Heidegger, a mood that has no definite object, in which the world as such, as a whole, shows up as threatening and meaningless.

References

• Heidegger, Martin. (1927) 2008. Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. Harper Perennial Modern Thought. New York: Harper Perennial.
  • Free: None. Cite by section and German page (H.), which both English translations print in the margin.
  • Publisher: HarperCollins (Harper Perennial Modern Thought; ISBN 97800615755940 · alternative translation: SUNY Press (Stambaugh, rev. Schmidt)
  • Free companion: SEP, "Martin Heidegger" (Wrathall), §2 · IEP, "Heidegger, Martin"

Introduction

"Understanding" usually names a cognitive achievement: grasping a proof or a theory. Heidegger uses the word for something more basic, a practical being-able-to that shapes every situation before any explicit thought.

This reading explains understanding as projection, interpretation as its development, and care as the structure that unifies Dasein's being. Citations to Being and Time give the section (§) and the German page (H.).

Understanding as Projection

In ordinary German, sich auf etwas verstehen means to be good at something, to know how. Heidegger builds on that sense. Understanding (Verstehen), in his account, is Dasein's projecting of itself onto possibilities: a practical know-how of being able to be, not primarily a cognitive act (Heidegger [1927] 2008, §31, H. 143–44).

Understanding has the structure of projection (Entwurf): the way understanding throws Dasein forward onto possibilities, which it lives toward without making them thematic (§31, H. 145). When you walk into a lecture hall as a teacher, you understand yourself in terms of the possibility of teaching. The podium, the slides, and the students show up accordingly. You don't first decide to be a teacher and then interpret the room. Your self-understanding already organizes what the room offers.

Two points follow.

• Possibilities come first. For Dasein, a possibility isn't a mere logical option. It's what Dasein is being, and the world shows up in its light.
• Understanding is always attuned. Heidegger holds that attunement and understanding are equally basic (§31, H. 142–43). A mood opens or closes possibilities, and understanding projects onto the ones that are open.

Interpretation

Understanding can be developed. Heidegger calls that development interpretation (Auslegung): making explicit what is already understood, working it out as something (§32, H. 148). When you see a hammer "as" too heavy, you've made explicit something your use already understood. Interpretation doesn't add meaning to a neutral object. It articulates what understanding has already disclosed.

Care

Attunement, understanding, and absorption in the world aren't separate faculties. Heidegger argues that they're moments of one structure, which he calls care (Sorge): the unified being of Dasein, as being-ahead-of-itself, already-in-the-world, and alongside the beings it encounters (§41, H. 191–92).

"Care" here doesn't mean worry or concern for others. It's a formal name for the fact that Dasein's being is always at issue for it. The three moments can be traced in a single activity: preparing a lecture.

1. Ahead-of-itself. You're projecting onto a possibility: giving a clear lecture tomorrow. This is understanding at work.
2. Already-in-the-world. You find yourself already thrown into a situation: this teaching term, this deadline, this mood of mild dread. This is attunement at work.
3. Alongside the beings you encounter. You're absorbed in the slides, the notes, and the citations you need. This is everyday involvement with equipment.

The moments aren't stages. They hold together at every moment, and each corresponds to one of Heidegger's analyses: understanding, attunement, and everyday dealings with equipment.

Conclusion

For Heidegger, understanding is projection onto possibilities, a practical being-able-to that's always attuned. Interpretation develops it by making explicit what's already understood. Care unifies Dasein's being as ahead-of-itself, already-in-the-world, and alongside the beings it encounters.

Key Terms

• Understanding (Verstehen): In Heidegger, Dasein's projecting of itself onto possibilities: a practical know-how of being able to be, not primarily a cognitive act.
• Projection (Entwurf): In Heidegger, the way understanding throws Dasein forward onto possibilities, which it lives toward without making them thematic.
• Interpretation (Auslegung): In Heidegger, making explicit what is already understood: working it out as something.
• Care (Sorge): In Heidegger, the unified being of Dasein, as being-ahead-of-itself, already-in-the-world, and alongside the beings it encounters.

References

• Heidegger, Martin. (1927) 2008. Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. Harper Perennial Modern Thought. New York: Harper Perennial.
  • Free: None. Cite by section and German page (H.), which both English translations print in the margin.
  • Publisher: HarperCollins (Harper Perennial Modern Thought; ISBN 97800615755940 · alternative translation: SUNY Press (Stambaugh, rev. Schmidt)
  • Free companion: SEP, "Martin Heidegger" (Wrathall), §2 · IEP, "Heidegger, Martin"

Introduction

Care has three moments, and one of them names something unflattering: our tendency to lose ourselves in what everyone does. Heidegger calls the everyone "the 'they.'"

This reading sets out the care structure in a table, then explains falling and the "they." Citations to Being and Time give the section (§) and the German page (H.).

The Care Structure

Heidegger defines care (Sorge) as the unified being of Dasein, as being-ahead-of-itself, already-in-the-world, and alongside the beings it encounters (Heidegger [1927] 2008, §41, H. 191–92). Each moment corresponds to an existential structure and to a way the world is disclosed.

Existentiality is the ahead-of-itself moment of care: Dasein's being out ahead of itself in its possibilities. Facticity, the second moment, is Dasein's always already finding itself in a world. The third moment is falling.

Falling

Falling (Verfallen), in Heidegger, is Dasein's everyday absorption in the world of its concerns and in the "they," through which it understands itself in their terms (§38, H. 175). Heidegger insists that the word isn't a moral judgment or a fall from a higher state. Falling is a basic tendency of everyday existence. We understand ourselves through the things we're busy with and the roles we play, rather than as the beings whose own being is at issue.

The "They"

Who is Dasein in everyday life? Heidegger's answer is uncomfortable: usually, nobody in particular (§27, H. 126–27).

The "they" (das Man) is the anonymous public "one" whose norms govern what anyone does, says, and feels in everyday life. The German man is the impersonal pronoun of "one doesn't do that" or "that's how one holds a fork." Heidegger describes our relation to it this way: we enjoy ourselves as one enjoys oneself, read and judge as one reads and judges, and are shocked by what one finds shocking (§27, H. 126–27).

He picks out several features of the "they."

• Averageness. It sets the standard of what's normal and acceptable.
• Leveling down. Every exception is smoothed over, and anything original becomes something everyone already knew.
• Publicness. It supplies the ready-made interpretation of everything, which is always right because it never goes to the things themselves.
• Disburdening. It takes over responsibility. When "one" decides, nobody has to.

Two cautions matter. First, the "they" isn't a group of other people set against you. You're part of it. Heidegger speaks of the "they-self," the everyday self shaped by public norms. Second, the "they" isn't simply bad. Heidegger calls it an existential structure of Dasein (§27, H. 129). Shared norms are what make a common world intelligible at all. You couldn't use a fork or a language without them.

What the "they" does do is cover over the fact that each Dasein's being is its own. That's why the contrast with authenticity, in Division II, turns on it.

Conclusion

Care's three moments are existentiality, facticity, and falling: being ahead of oneself in possibilities, already thrown into a world, and absorbed alongside things. Falling is everyday absorption in concerns and in the "they." The "they" is the anonymous public "one" whose norms shape everyday life. It's constitutive of shared intelligibility, and it also covers over Dasein's ownmost being.

Key Terms

• Care (Sorge): In Heidegger, the unified being of Dasein, as being-ahead-of-itself, already-in-the-world, and alongside the beings it encounters.
• Existentiality: In Heidegger, the ahead-of-itself moment of care: Dasein's being out ahead of itself in its possibilities.
• Falling (Verfallen): In Heidegger, Dasein's everyday absorption in the world of its concerns and in the "they," through which it understands itself in their terms.
• The "they" (das Man): In Heidegger, the anonymous public "one" whose norms govern what anyone does, says, and feels in everyday life.

References

• Heidegger, Martin. (1927) 2008. Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. Harper Perennial Modern Thought. New York: Harper Perennial.
  • Free: None. Cite by section and German page (H.), which both English translations print in the margin.
  • Publisher: HarperCollins (Harper Perennial Modern Thought; ISBN 97800615755940 · alternative translation: SUNY Press (Stambaugh, rev. Schmidt)
  • Free companion: SEP, "Martin Heidegger" (Wrathall), §2 · IEP, "Heidegger, Martin"

Introduction

Division I of Being and Time describes Dasein in its everyday being. Division II asks what that description leaves out, and answers with death, conscience, and time.

This reading gives an overview of Division II, notes how Heidegger's account of mood is used in psychiatry today, and pairs the key terms of disclosure across the two English translations. Citations to Being and Time give the section (§) and the German page (H.).

Division II in Overview

Division II returns to the care structure to find its unity and its meaning (Wrathall 2025, §2). Its main moves can be set out in order.

1. Being-toward-death. Death, for Heidegger, isn't an event at the end of life. It's Dasein's ownmost possibility: certain, indefinite as to when, and something no one can do for you. Dasein relates to it all along, usually by fleeing it into what "one" says about death (§§46–53).
2. Anxiety and the call of conscience. Anxiety brings Dasein before its being-toward-death. Conscience, in Heidegger's sense, is a silent call from Dasein to itself, out of the "they" and toward its own possibilities (§§54–60).
3. Authenticity and inauthenticity. Authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) is owning one's existence: taking over one's possibilities as one's own, rather than as what "one" does. The German is built on eigen, "own." Inauthenticity is Dasein's ordinary condition, lived through the "they." Heidegger insists it isn't a lesser degree of being.
4. Ecstatic temporality. Heidegger argues that time is the meaning of care. Being ahead of itself, already in the world, and alongside things correspond to the future, the past, and the present. These aren't points on a line but "ecstases," ways Dasein stands out into time (§§61–71).

The overview is enough to show the book's shape. The analyses of mood, understanding, and care in Division I turn out to be temporal through and through.

Current Uptake

Heidegger's account of attunement is widely used in the philosophy of psychiatry. Matthew Ratcliffe develops it into an account of existential feelings: bodily feelings of being in the world as a whole, such as a sense of reality, belonging, or estrangement. He argues that such feelings change in psychiatric conditions such as depression and depersonalization (Ratcliffe 2008). More broadly, phenomenological psychopathology uses Heideggerian and other phenomenological concepts to describe how the world is lived in mental illness, as a complement to symptom checklists (Stanghellini et al. 2019).

Translating the Terms of Disclosure

The two English translations render several terms differently (Heidegger [1927] 2008; Heidegger [1927] 2010). The most consequential is Befindlichkeit. Macquarrie and Robinson's "state-of-mind" can mislead, because it suggests an inner mental state, which is exactly what Heidegger denies. Stambaugh and Schmidt's "attunement" better captures a way of being tuned to the world.

Conclusion

Division II takes up death, conscience, authenticity, and time, and argues that temporality is the meaning of care. Heidegger's account of attunement is used today in the philosophy of psychiatry and phenomenological psychopathology. Readers moving between translations should expect "attunement" for "state-of-mind" and "falling prey" for "falling."

Key Terms

• Attunement (Befindlichkeit): In Heidegger, the basic way Dasein always already finds itself in some mood, which discloses how it is faring in the world. Macquarrie and Robinson translate it as "state-of-mind."
• Thrownness (Geworfenheit): In Heidegger, the fact that Dasein finds itself already delivered over to a situation it didn't choose and has to take up.
• Understanding (Verstehen): In Heidegger, Dasein's projecting of itself onto possibilities: a practical know-how of being able to be, not primarily a cognitive act.
• Projection (Entwurf): In Heidegger, the way understanding throws Dasein forward onto possibilities, which it lives toward without making them thematic.
• Care (Sorge): In Heidegger, the unified being of Dasein, as being-ahead-of-itself, already-in-the-world, and alongside the beings it encounters.
• The "they" (das Man): In Heidegger, the anonymous public "one" whose norms govern what anyone does, says, and feels in everyday life.
• Falling (Verfallen): In Heidegger, Dasein's everyday absorption in the world of its concerns and in the "they," through which it understands itself in their terms.
• Authenticity (Eigentlichkeit): In Heidegger, owning one's existence: taking over one's possibilities as one's own, rather than as what "one" does.

References

• Heidegger, Martin. (1927) 2008. Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. Harper Perennial Modern Thought. New York: Harper Perennial.
  • Free: None. Cite by section and German page (H.), which both English translations print in the margin.
  • Publisher: HarperCollins (Harper Perennial Modern Thought; ISBN 97800615755940 · alternative translation: SUNY Press (Stambaugh, rev. Schmidt)
  • Free companion: SEP, "Martin Heidegger" (Wrathall), §2 · IEP, "Heidegger, Martin"
• Heidegger, Martin. (1927) 2010. Being and Time. Translated by Joan Stambaugh. Revised and with a foreword by Dennis J. Schmidt. SUNY Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy. Albany: State University of New York Press.
  • Free: None.
  • Publisher: SUNY Press
• Ratcliffe, Matthew. 2008. Feelings of Being: Phenomenology, Psychiatry and the Sense of Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Free: None.
  • Publisher: Oxford University Press · Oxford Academic (institutional access)
• Stanghellini, Giovanni, Matthew Broome, Anthony Vincent Fernandez, Paolo Fusar-Poli, Andrea Raballo, and René Rosfort, eds. 2019. The Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Free: None.
  • Publisher: Oxford University Press · Oxford Academic (institutional access)
• Wrathall, Mark. 2025. "Martin Heidegger." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman. https\://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heidegger/.

Introduction

Section 29 of Being and Time is only a few pages long, but it overturns a long-standing ranking of the mind's powers. Philosophers usually put cognition first and feeling second. Heidegger argues that moods disclose the world more basically than cognition can. This reading follows the section's argument in four moves. It then shows how Matthew Ratcliffe develops the point (Ratcliffe 2008), and ends with a model paraphrase and one applied example.

Locating the Passage

The section runs from H. 134 to H. 140 (Heidegger [1927] 2008, §29, H. 134–40). Both English translations print the German page numbers in the margin. Key phrases below are quoted from Macquarrie and Robinson, who translate the section's key term, Befindlichkeit, as "state-of-mind." Stambaugh and Schmidt use "attunement," and this reading follows them (Heidegger [1927] 2010). Heidegger's word for a particular mood is Stimmung, which also means the tuning of an instrument.

No free English translation is available. The free Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Heidegger summarizes his account of attunement (Wrathall 2025).

Before you start, note where the section sits. Heidegger is analyzing "being-in," the way Dasein is in the world. Attunement is the first of the structures through which Dasein's being-in is disclosed. Understanding and discourse follow.

Walking Through the Argument

Step 1: A mood is always already there

Heidegger begins with the everyday: evenness, ill humor, elation, and the pallid lack of mood that fills most days (§29, H. 134). His first claim is that there's no mood-free baseline. What we call being in no mood is itself a mood.

That rules out a familiar picture, in which a neutral mind sometimes has moods added to it. For Heidegger, we can only master a mood by way of a counter-mood. We never step outside moods altogether (H. 136).

Step 2: Moods disclose thrownness

In a mood, Dasein is brought before the bare fact that it is, and has to be. The mood makes manifest "how one is" (H. 134), without disclosing where one came from or where one is going. Heidegger calls this the thrownness of Dasein into its "there" (H. 135).

The point isn't that we reflect on our thrownness when moody. Mostly we turn away from it. But even turning away is a way of being brought before it. A heavy mood discloses, all the same, that one's existence is a burden to be carried.

Step 3: Moods disclose the world as a whole

Moods aren't directed at one object, the way a perception is. They disclose being-in-the-world as a whole, and they make it possible to direct oneself toward particular things at all (H. 137).

Heidegger's formulation is precise. A mood, he writes, "comes neither from 'outside' nor from 'inside'" (H. 136). It arises out of being-in-the-world as a way of being in it. The mood isn't an inner state that gets projected outward. It's how the world, oneself, and others are there together.

Step 4: Moods make it possible for things to matter

This is the step that carries the most weight. Only because Dasein is attuned can anything touch it or strike it: threaten it, invite it, bore it (H. 137). A purely perceiving, moodless subject would register objects, but nothing would matter to it. Heidegger says that attunement makes Dasein open to being affected in the first place.

So the world is disclosed in a mood before it's grasped in cognition. Heidegger adds that the possibilities of disclosure belonging to cognition reach "far too short a way" compared with those belonging to moods (H. 134).

Why Mood Comes Before Cognition, and How Ratcliffe Develops It

Heidegger's priority claim isn't anti-rational. He doesn't say moods are more accurate than beliefs. He says they're more basic: cognition operates within a world already disclosed as mattering, and a mood is what discloses it that way. Even theoretical observation has its mood, a tranquil dwelling with things (H. 138).

Ratcliffe develops this claim into an account of existential feelings: bodily feelings that aren't about any object, but are ways of finding oneself in the world as a whole (Ratcliffe 2008). They include the sense that things are real, that others are reachable, and that the world offers possibilities. Ratcliffe argues that these feelings form the background against which particular emotions and beliefs take shape. When they change, as in severe depression, the world itself is experienced differently, and nothing can matter in the old way. His work shows how Heidegger's claim can be made precise enough to guide descriptions of psychiatric experience.

Key Considerations

Terms and translations.

A common misreading. The most common misreading treats moods as private inner states projected onto a neutral world, like colored glasses. That misreads §29 in three ways.

• It presupposes a neutral world. Heidegger denies that there's a moodless world that moods then color. The world is always disclosed in some mood.
• It locates the mood inside. Heidegger says moods come neither from outside nor from inside, but arise out of being-in-the-world.
• It makes moods unreliable additions. For Heidegger, moods are how things can matter at all. Without them, there'd be no world to be accurate or inaccurate about.

Summary

Section 29 argues that a mood is always already there, that moods disclose thrownness, that they disclose being-in-the-world as a whole, and that they make it possible for things to matter. Cognition works within a world that moods have already disclosed. Here is a model paraphrase to check your reading against:

For Heidegger, we always find ourselves in some mood, even the flat mood of an ordinary day. A mood isn't an inner state laid over a neutral world. It comes neither from outside nor from inside, but is a way of being in the world. Moods disclose that we're thrown into a situation we didn't choose, they disclose the world as a whole, and they let things matter to us at all. That's why disclosure through mood comes before cognition: thinking about things always happens in a world already attuned (Heidegger [1927] 2008, §29).

Applied example. On a morning of low-level dread before a job interview, the whole city shows up as a test. The train is late in a way that counts, strangers seem to be judging, and the coffee shop's noise is an obstacle. Nothing in particular is feared; the dread isn't about the train. Yet the mood discloses a world in which everything bears on one possibility, and in which you find yourself thrown into a situation you have to get through.

References

• Heidegger, Martin. (1927) 2008. Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. Harper Perennial Modern Thought. New York: Harper Perennial.
  • Free: None. Cite by section and German page (H.), which both English translations print in the margin.
  • Publisher: HarperCollins (Harper Perennial Modern Thought; ISBN 97800615755940 · alternative translation: SUNY Press (Stambaugh, rev. Schmidt)
  • Free companion: SEP, "Martin Heidegger" (Wrathall), §2 · IEP, "Heidegger, Martin"
• Heidegger, Martin. (1927) 2010. Being and Time. Translated by Joan Stambaugh. Revised and with a foreword by Dennis J. Schmidt. SUNY Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy. Albany: State University of New York Press.
  • Free: None.
  • Publisher: SUNY Press
• Ratcliffe, Matthew. 2008. Feelings of Being: Phenomenology, Psychiatry and the Sense of Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Free: None.
  • Publisher: Oxford University Press · Oxford Academic (institutional access)
• Wrathall, Mark. 2025. "Martin Heidegger." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman. https\://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heidegger/.