KnowledgeInSight
AI Literacy
0% of Course 3 complete

Module 3 · Lesson 1

Information and Rights: Synthetic media, misinformation, and trust

You'll compare the predicted flood of AI-generated misinformation with what researchers have measured, and look at harms that are well documented, such as fraud. You'll be able to say where the evidence is strong, where it's thin, and why trust itself is part of the problem.

What you will be able to do

  • Assess the evidence on how AI-generated content affects misinformation and public trust.

0% of this lesson · 9 items · 1h 3m total · 48m without the optional journal

Contents of this lesson9 items
  1. ReadingThe Deepfake Election That Didn't Happen, and the Deepfake Fraud That Did3 min
  2. ReadingSynthetic Media and Documented Harms: Fraud, Impersonation, and Non-Consensual Imagery4 min
  3. ReadingAI and Elections: The Predicted Flood and the Measured Effect4 min
  4. ReadingThe Liar's Dividend: How Awareness of Fakes Can Erode Trust in What's Real4 min
  5. ReadingProvenance and Labeling: Content Credentials and Disclosure Requirements4 min
  6. Guided ReadingGuided Close Reading: Chesney and Citron's Definition of the Liar's Dividend7 min
  7. Guided ConversationWeigh a Claim About AI and Misinformation12 min
  8. Journal · optionalHow You Decide What's Real15 min
  9. Knowledge CheckSynthetic media, misinformation, and trust10 min

Reading 3 min

The Deepfake Election That Didn't Happen, and the Deepfake Fraud That Did

This content reflects the field as of October 2026.

Before the elections of 2024, news coverage warned that AI-generated fakes would swamp voters with false video and audio and tip the results. That year a fake did cause a large, documented loss, and it had nothing to do with voting.

Take the election first. The Centre for Emerging Technology and Security is a research center at The Alan Turing Institute, the United Kingdom's national institute for data science and AI. Its researchers reviewed AI-enabled attempts to sway opinion around the 2024 US presidential election. They reported "a lack of evidence that AI-enabled disinformation has had a measurable impact" on the result (Stockwell et al. 2024).

The authors attach a caution to that finding. It is "primarily due to insufficient data" on how such content affects what voters do. They also report that deceptive AI-generated content shaped the campaign's public discussion by amplifying other false claims.

Now the fraud. In January 2024 the British engineering firm Arup told Hong Kong police that one of its employees had been deceived. He had joined a video call with people who looked and sounded like the firm's chief financial officer and other colleagues. They were deepfakes: AI-generated imitations of real people. He then sent about 25 million US dollars, in 15 transfers, to accounts the fraudsters controlled (Magramo 2024).

The harm that was predicted and the harm that was documented differ in kind.

  • The predicted harm falls on a whole electorate. Showing it would require evidence that a fake changed how many people voted, and researchers say they lack the data to tell.
  • The documented harm fell on one firm. It needed one person to believe one call, and it left bank records and a police report.

Neither fact cancels the other. The fraud doesn't show that elections are being swung, and the election review doesn't show that synthetic media is harmless. A claim that "AI misinformation is destroying democracy" and a claim that "the deepfake panic was overblown" both skip over this difference.

Two questions sort most claims you'll meet about AI and false content. The first is who is harmed: a person, a company, a group of voters, or the public's general willingness to believe evidence. The second is how the harm would be measured: by money lost, by votes changed, by survey answers, or by nothing anyone has yet worked out how to count.

Some harms come with a victim and a paper trail. Others are spread thinly across millions of people and may never show up in any dataset, which doesn't mean they aren't happening. Knowing which kind of claim you're reading tells you how much evidence to expect, and how much weight the claim can bear when the evidence isn't there.

References

  • Magramo, Kathleen. 2024. "British Engineering Giant Arup Revealed as $25 Million Deepfake Scam Victim." CNN Business, May 17, 2024.
  • Stockwell, Sam, Megan Hughes, Phil Swatton, and 3 others. 2024. AI-Enabled Influence Operations: Safeguarding Future Elections. London: Centre for Emerging Technology and Security, The Alan Turing Institute, November 13, 2024.

Report an issue with this item

Reading 4 min

Synthetic Media and Documented Harms: Fraud, Impersonation, and Non-Consensual Imagery

This content reflects the field as of October 2026.

Introduction

A familiar voice on the phone, or a colleague's face on a video call, used to be good evidence of who you were dealing with. AI tools can now produce both.

This reading describes what can be generated, the kinds of harm that have been documented, and why harm to individuals and firms is easier to establish than harm to public opinion.

What Can Be Generated

Synthetic media is text, images, audio, or video produced or altered by an AI system. The International AI Safety Report 2026 is a review of scientific evidence written by more than 100 independent experts and chaired by Yoshua Bengio, a computer scientist at the University of Montreal. It states that general-purpose AI systems "can generate high-quality text, audio, images, and video" (Bengio and others 2026, sec. 2.1.1).

A deepfake is an AI-generated or AI-altered image, audio clip, or video that shows a real person saying or doing something they didn't say or do. The word was already in use in 2019, when Bobby Chesney and Danielle Citron, then law professors at the University of Texas and the University of Maryland, published an early analysis of the risks (Chesney and Citron 2019). The tools they described took skill to use. Products from many companies now let someone with no training produce a realistic image, voice, or clip from a short description or a sample.

One Case in Detail

In January 2024 the British engineering firm Arup reported a fraud to Hong Kong police. According to police accounts reported by CNN, an employee in the firm's Hong Kong office received a message asking for a secret transaction. He then joined a video call in which the other participants looked and sounded like the chief financial officer and colleagues he recognized. All of them were deepfakes (Magramo 2024).

He made 15 transfers totaling 200 million Hong Kong dollars, about 25.6 million US dollars. Arup said that "none of our internal systems were compromised" (Magramo 2024). No computer was broken into. A person was persuaded.

Two things happened in that call. Impersonation is pretending to be a specific real person in order to deceive someone. Fraud is deceiving someone in order to take their money or property. Synthetic media made the first convincing enough to accomplish the second.

Categories of Documented Harm

The international report lists the criminal uses of AI-generated content as "scams, fraud, blackmail, extortion, defamation," and the production of sexual imagery without consent, including imagery of children (Bengio and others 2026, sec. 2.1.1). Three categories account for most of what has been recorded.

CategoryWhat happensWho is harmed
Financial fraudA faked voice or video persuades someone to send money or reveal informationThe person deceived, and the firm or family whose money it is
Impersonation for other endsA fake shows a real person saying or doing something damaging, or is used to threaten themThe person depicted
Sexual imagery made without consentA real person's face or body is placed into sexual images or videoThe person depicted

Chesney and Citron anticipated the second and third categories in 2019. They warned that blackmailers could use fakes "to extract something of value" and that a person's face could be "swapped into real pornography" (Chesney and Citron 2019, pt. II).

By one measure the third category is the largest. The international report cites a study's estimate that 96 percent of deepfake videos online are pornographic (Bengio and others 2026, sec. 2.1.1).

Why These Harms Are Easier to Document

Each harm in the table has three features that claims about public opinion usually lack.

  • A victim. A named person or firm was harmed and can say so.
  • A loss. Money left an account, or an image was made and shared.
  • A record. There are bank transfers, police reports, or the files themselves.

With all three, an investigator can establish what happened without having to estimate what millions of people believed.

Counting is harder than establishing single cases. The international report says harmful incidents involving AI-generated content "are becoming more common." Its evidence is the number of incidents reported in the media, which has risen substantially since 2021 (Bengio and others 2026, sec. 2.1.1). Media reports capture the cases that become public. Many victims of fraud or of sexual imagery never report it, and the report notes that limited data makes it hard to know how widespread some practices are.

Conclusion

As of October 2026 the best-documented harms from synthetic media are to individuals and firms: fraud, impersonation, and sexual imagery made without consent. Single cases can be established in detail because each has a victim, a loss, and a record. How often such cases occur is less certain, since the counts rest largely on what gets reported.

Key Terms

  • Synthetic media: Text, images, audio, or video produced or altered by an AI system.
  • Deepfake: An AI-generated or AI-altered image, audio clip, or video that shows a real person saying or doing something they didn't say or do.
  • Impersonation: Pretending to be a specific real person in order to deceive someone.
  • Fraud: Deceiving someone in order to take their money or property.

References

  • Bengio, Yoshua, and others. 2026. International AI Safety Report 2026: Extended Summary for Policymakers. Published February 3, 2026.
  • Chesney, Bobby, and Danielle Citron. 2019. "Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National Security." California Law Review 107: 1753.
  • Magramo, Kathleen. 2024. "British Engineering Giant Arup Revealed as $25 Million Deepfake Scam Victim." CNN Business, May 17, 2024.

Report an issue with this item

Reading 4 min

AI and Elections: The Predicted Flood and the Measured Effect

This content reflects the field as of October 2026.

Introduction

When chatbots and image generators became widely available, many commentators predicted that elections would be flooded with convincing fakes. Several large elections have been held since, and researchers have looked for the effect.

This reading sets out the argument that the fear was overstated, what a review of the 2024 US presidential election found, and the case that real effects may be going unmeasured. The question is contested.

The Terms

Misinformation is false or misleading information, whether or not the person spreading it knows it's false. Disinformation is false information spread deliberately in order to deceive. An influence operation is an organized effort to shift public opinion by deceptive means, often run by or for a government.

The flood prediction is about disinformation and influence operations. AI lowers the cost of producing false content, so the worry was that there would be far more of it, that it would be more convincing, and that it could be tailored to each voter.

The Argument That the Fear Is Overblown

In October 2023 three researchers who study misinformation answered that prediction. They were Felix Simon of the University of Oxford, Sacha Altay of the University of Zurich, and Hugo Mercier of the Institut Jean Nicod in Paris. They argued that concerns about generative AI and misinformation "are overblown" (Simon, Altay, and Mercier 2023). They took the three worries one at a time.

WorryTheir reply
More false contentFalse content is already plentiful and cheap. What limits its effect is how much of it people want, since "the consumption of misinformation is mostly limited by demand and not by supply"
More convincing contentMost people get their news from a small number of mainstream outlets, so better fakes reach few of them
Content tailored to each voterThe evidence on targeted political messages shows they have "mostly limited persuasive effects"

Their article was written before the 2024 elections. It was a forecast based on earlier research into how people consume news.

What a Review of the 2024 Election Found

In November 2024 the Centre for Emerging Technology and Security, a research center at The Alan Turing Institute in the United Kingdom, published a review of AI-enabled influence operations around the US presidential election. It made three findings that have to be read together (Stockwell et al. 2024).

  1. There is "a lack of evidence that AI-enabled disinformation has had a measurable impact" on the election result.
  2. That lack is "primarily due to insufficient data on the impact of such disinformation on real-world voter behaviour."
  3. Deceptive AI-generated content "did shape US election discourse by amplifying other forms of disinformation and inflaming political debates."

A measurable effect is a change that researchers can detect in data and attribute to a specific cause. The first finding says none was detected on the outcome. The second says the tools for detecting one are weak. The review adds that falsehoods made without AI continued to have a significant impact.

The Case That Effects Are Being Missed

People who remain concerned don't dispute these findings. They read the second one as the important one. Their argument has three parts.

  • Effects may be diffuse. Content that inflames debate, as the review found, may change how people feel about politics without changing a vote that anyone can trace.
  • Effects may be delayed. Repeated exposure over years could wear down confidence in news generally. A study of one election wouldn't see that.
  • Effects may be concentrated. A national result is hard to move. A local race decided by a few hundred votes, with little news coverage, is easier.

Each of these is a possibility that the available data can't confirm or rule out. No study cited here shows that any of them has happened.

Where the Evidence Stands

ClaimStatus
AI-generated content was used in attempts to influence the 2024 US electionDocumented
It changed the resultNot shown
It shaped discussion by amplifying other false claimsReported by the review
It has no effect on votersNot shown; data on voter behavior is insufficient
Subtle, delayed, or local effectsNot measured

The evidence is stronger on one side of this debate. No one has demonstrated that AI-generated content changed an election outcome, and the 2023 forecast has held up so far on that point. What is absent is good measurement of anything subtler than an outcome. An absence of evidence produced by weak measurement is a weaker result than a careful search that found nothing.

Conclusion

As of October 2026, research finds little evidence that AI-generated content has changed election outcomes, and the main review of the 2024 US election says its own data on voter behavior was insufficient. Skeptics of the flood prediction point to limited demand for false content. Those who remain worried point to effects that current studies can't see. The first group has more evidence, and neither has settled the matter.

Key Terms

  • Misinformation: False or misleading information, whether or not the person spreading it knows it's false.
  • Disinformation: False information spread deliberately in order to deceive.
  • Influence operation: An organized effort to shift public opinion by deceptive means, often run by or for a government.
  • Measurable effect: A change that researchers can detect in data and attribute to a specific cause.

References

  • Simon, Felix M., Sacha Altay, and Hugo Mercier. 2023. "Misinformation Reloaded? Fears About the Impact of Generative AI on Misinformation Are Overblown." Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review, October 18, 2023.
  • Stockwell, Sam, Megan Hughes, Phil Swatton, and 3 others. 2024. AI-Enabled Influence Operations: Safeguarding Future Elections. London: Centre for Emerging Technology and Security, The Alan Turing Institute, November 13, 2024.

Report an issue with this item

Reading 4 min

The Liar's Dividend: How Awareness of Fakes Can Erode Trust in What's Real

Introduction

When a damaging recording of a public figure appears, a common response now is "that's AI." Sometimes the claim is true. The fact that it's available at all is a consequence of synthetic media that doesn't depend on anyone making a fake.

This reading explains the idea known as the liar's dividend, how it works, why it differs from the fear of a flood of fakes, and what kind of evidence supports it.

The Term

The term comes from a 2019 article by Bobby Chesney and Danielle Citron, then law professors at the University of Texas and the University of Maryland. A deepfake, in their usage, is a fabricated video or audio recording realistic enough to pass as genuine.

After listing the harms that fakes could do by being believed, they turn to a harm of a different kind. They write that "some of the most dangerous lies take the form of denials" (Chesney and Citron 2019, "The Liar's Dividend").

The liar's dividend is the benefit a liar gains when the public knows convincing fakes exist, because real evidence can then be dismissed as fake. Their own sentence is: "this dividend flows, perversely, in proportion to success in educating the public about the dangers of deep fakes."

How It Works

The mechanism has three steps.

  1. Convincing fakes become possible, and the public learns that they are.
  2. Someone is caught on a genuine recording saying or doing something damaging.
  3. That person says the recording is fake. Because fakes are known to exist, the denial can't be dismissed out of hand.

Chesney and Citron describe the audience for step 3: "a skeptical public will be primed to doubt the authenticity of real audio and video evidence." Authenticity here means the quality of being what something is presented as, such as a real recording of a real event.

The person in step 3 gains plausible deniability: the ability to deny something in a way that others can't easily disprove. A recording once closed off that option.

What the liar draws on is a change in trust, meaning willingness to rely on a source or a piece of evidence without checking it yourself. People once extended that trust to video and audio almost automatically.

Why This Differs from the Flood

The more familiar worry is that people will believe fakes. The liar's dividend runs the other way.

The flood worryThe liar's dividend
What people doBelieve something falseDisbelieve something true
What it requiresA fake that is made, distributed, and believedOnly public awareness that fakes are possible
What is damagedBelief about one eventThe standing of genuine evidence
Who gainsWhoever made the fakeWhoever is exposed by real evidence

The second row matters most. Under the liar's dividend no fake has to be believed, and none has to exist. A study that finds few people were fooled by deepfakes therefore leaves this harm untouched.

The Tension for Education

The usual advice about synthetic media is to be skeptical: check sources, and don't trust a clip because it looks real. The liar's dividend complicates that advice. Chesney and Citron say the dividend grows with "success in educating the public," so the same lesson that protects people from fakes gives liars their opening.

They note that such skepticism "can be invoked just as well against authentic as against adulterated content." Doubt applied evenly to everything doesn't help anyone tell a real recording from a false one.

Teaching about fakes can still protect people, and what it teaches matters. A lesson that stops at "doubt what you see" feeds the dividend. A lesson that adds "here is how to check where this came from" gives people something to do with their doubt.

What Kind of Evidence Supports It

The liar's dividend was introduced as an argument. Chesney and Citron reasoned from how the technology works and from the existing habit of dismissing unwelcome reports as "fake news." They presented no measurement of it, and their article was written about video and audio made with the tools of 2019.

Measuring it is hard for a specific reason. You'd need to know how many people would have accepted a piece of genuine evidence if deepfakes didn't exist, and that comparison can't be observed directly. Individual cases in which someone calls real evidence fake are easy to find. They show that the move is used. They don't show how often it works.

Conclusion

The liar's dividend is the advantage that awareness of fakes hands to anyone who wants to deny real evidence. It needs no fake to be made or believed, which separates it from the fear of a flood. It is a well-reasoned mechanism supported by cases, and its size hasn't been measured.

Key Terms

  • Liar's dividend: The benefit a liar gains when the public knows convincing fakes exist, because real evidence can then be dismissed as fake.
  • Authenticity: The quality of being what something is presented as, such as a real recording of a real event.
  • Plausible deniability: The ability to deny something in a way that others can't easily disprove.
  • Trust: Willingness to rely on a source or a piece of evidence without checking it yourself.

References

  • Chesney, Bobby, and Danielle Citron. 2019. "Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National Security." California Law Review 107: 1753.

Report an issue with this item

Reading 4 min

Provenance and Labeling: Content Credentials and Disclosure Requirements

This content reflects the field as of October 2026.

Introduction

Some images online now carry a small badge you can click to see where the image came from, and some AI products announce that their output is machine-made. Both are attempts to answer the same question: how can anyone tell what a piece of content is and where it has been?

This reading describes two responses that exist today. One is a technical standard for recording a file's history. The other is a legal duty to mark AI-generated content. It describes what they do and where they fall short, and it doesn't assess whether the rules are well designed.

Provenance

Provenance is a record of where a piece of content came from and how it has been edited. The word comes from the art world, where a painting's provenance is its chain of owners.

For a digital file, that record is usually kept as metadata: information stored alongside a file that describes it, such as when and how it was made. A provenance record might say that a photograph was taken on a certain camera, cropped in an editing program, and had one part generated by an AI tool.

Content Credentials

The Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity, known as C2PA, publishes what it calls "an open technical standard for publishers, creators and consumers to establish the origin and edits of digital content" (Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity n.d.).

Content Credentials is that industry standard for attaching a verifiable provenance record to a piece of digital content. The coalition describes it this way: "Content Credentials function like a nutrition label for digital content." A camera, an editing program, or an AI tool that supports the standard adds an entry to the record, and the record is signed so that tampering can be detected.

The coalition's steering committee, as listed on its site in October 2026, includes Adobe, Amazon, the BBC, Google, Meta, Microsoft, OpenAI, Sony, and TikTok, among others. Several of these companies make the tools that generate synthetic media or run the platforms where it spreads. A standard they control is useful to them, and its description as a nutrition label is theirs.

Labeling Duties in the European Union

Labeling means marking content so that people or software can tell it was generated or altered by AI. The European Union's Artificial Intelligence Act makes some labeling a legal duty. Article 50 sets out several obligations (European Commission 2026b).

WhoWhat they must do
Providers of AI systems that interact with peopleMake sure people are informed that they're dealing with an AI system, unless it's obvious
Providers of systems that generate audio, image, video, or textMake sure outputs are "marked in a machine-readable format and detectable as artificially generated or manipulated"
Those who use a system to make a deepfakeDisclose that the content was artificially generated or manipulated
Those who publish AI-generated text to inform the public on matters of public interestDisclose it, unless a person has reviewed the text and holds editorial responsibility

One common way to meet the second duty is a watermark: a signal embedded in the content itself, often invisible to people, that software can detect.

These obligations apply from August 2, 2026. A 2026 amendment gave providers whose systems were already on the market before that date a further four months to meet the marking duty (European Union 2026, recital 38). This describes the law of one jurisdiction as of October 2026. It isn't legal advice.

Limits

Neither response settles what is real. Three limits apply to both.

  • Marks can be removed. Metadata can be lost when a file is screenshotted, re-saved, or uploaded to a service that strips it. Watermarks are harder to remove and can still be weakened by editing. Article 50 itself requires marking to be robust only "as far as this is technically feasible."
  • An unmarked file isn't thereby genuine. Content made with a tool that doesn't mark its output, or by someone who removed the mark, carries no label. The absence of a label tells you nothing.
  • Adoption is partial. A provenance record helps only if the device that made the file, the software that edited it, and the site that displays it all support the standard. Many don't.

A provenance record is strongest as positive evidence. A photograph with an intact record from camera to publication gives you a reason to trust it. A file with no record gives you no reason either way.

Conclusion

As of October 2026 two responses to synthetic media are in use: an industry standard that attaches a signed history to a file, and European rules that require AI-generated content to be marked and certain uses disclosed. Both can confirm where some content came from. Neither can show that unmarked content is authentic, and both depend on adoption that is still incomplete.

Key Terms

  • Provenance: A record of where a piece of content came from and how it has been edited.
  • Metadata: Information stored alongside a file that describes it, such as when and how it was made.
  • Content Credentials: An industry standard for attaching a verifiable provenance record to a piece of digital content.
  • Labeling: Marking content so that people or software can tell it was generated or altered by AI.
  • Watermark: A signal embedded in the content itself, often invisible to people, that software can detect.

References

  • Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity. n.d. "C2PA." Accessed October 3, 2026.
  • European Commission. 2026b. "Article 50: Transparency Obligations for Providers and Deployers of Certain AI Systems." AI Act Service Desk. Accessed October 3, 2026.
  • European Union. 2026. Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 (Digital Omnibus on AI). Official Journal of the European Union, July 24, 2026.

Report an issue with this item

Guided Reading 7 min

Guided Close Reading: Chesney and Citron's Definition of the Liar's Dividend

Introduction

"Liar's dividend" has become a common phrase in coverage of deepfakes, and it is often used loosely to mean any harm that fakes do. The two law professors who coined it meant something narrower.

This reading goes through the passage where they introduce the term, one sentence at a time, to pin down what the term covers and what it leaves out.

Locating the Passage

The article is "Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National Security," by Bobby Chesney and Danielle Citron, published in the California Law Review in 2019. Both were law professors at the time, Chesney at the University of Texas and Citron at the University of Maryland. The journal's website carries the full text free, and the link is in the References.

The article has no numbered paragraphs, so this reading cites it by heading. The passage is a short subsection titled "The Liar's Dividend: Beware the Cry of Deep-Fake News." It closes the article's survey of harms to society, in the second of the article's main parts. The article's introduction also previews the idea in one sentence. All quotations are from the article (Chesney and Citron 2019).

"Deep fake" is the authors' spelling. They use it for fabricated video or audio that is realistic enough to pass as a genuine recording.

Walking Through the Passage

Step 1: Read the sentence that names the term and identify who benefits

The naming sentence comes at the start of the subsection's fourth paragraph: "Hence what we call the liar's dividend: this dividend flows, perversely, in proportion to success in educating the public about the dangers of deep fakes."

A dividend is a payout to someone who holds a stake. The person paid here is in the name: the liar. The subsection's opening has already said which kind of liar. Every harm the article listed before this point came from using a fake "to convince people that fictional things really occurred." Then the authors turn: "some of the most dangerous lies take the form of denials."

So the beneficiary is a person who denies something. This person hasn't made a fake and may never have seen one.

Step 2: Read "things that are in fact true" and note that the harm is to true evidence

The article's introduction previews the idea by saying that deep fakes make it easier for liars to avoid accountability for "things that are in fact true."

The phrase tells you what is being denied. The liar's target is a true report or a genuine recording. In the subsection the authors describe the liar "denouncing authentic video and audio as deep fakes."

This reverses the usual picture of deepfake harm. In the usual picture a false thing is taken for true. Here a true thing is taken for false, or at least placed in doubt. The damage falls on real evidence and on whoever relied on it: a journalist, a court, a member of the public trying to work out what happened.

Step 3: Read the elaboration that the dividend grows with public education about fakes

The third paragraph of the subsection explains why the denial works: "liars aiming to dodge responsibility for their real words and actions will become more credible as the public becomes more educated about the threats posed by deep fakes."

The authors mark this with the word "Ironically." In the naming sentence they use "perversely." Both words flag the same point. Public education about fakes is meant as a protection, and it is also what makes the denial believable.

They then state the result plainly: "a skeptical public will be primed to doubt the authenticity of real audio and video evidence." And they add: "This skepticism can be invoked just as well against authentic as against adulterated content."

The phrase "in proportion to" in the naming sentence sets up a relationship of degree. A public that has never heard of deepfakes gives the liar nothing. A public that has heard a great deal gives the liar a ready audience.

Step 4: Ask what follows for media literacy teaching

The passage doesn't tell teachers what to do. The implication can be drawn from it.

If the lesson people take away is "any recording might be fake," the dividend is at its largest, because that belief is exactly what the liar needs. The authors' sentence about skepticism being "invoked just as well against authentic" content describes doubt that doesn't discriminate.

A different lesson is "here is how to find out whether this recording is genuine": who published it first, whether the original file exists, whether other recordings or witnesses agree. Someone taught this still doubts. They also have a way to resolve the doubt, so a bare denial has less force with them.

The passage supports the first half of this directly. The second half is an inference from it, and the authors don't make it in this subsection.

Step 5: Test the idea against one hypothetical case of a denied recording

Here is an invented case. A city council member is recorded at a private dinner promising a contract to a donor. A local reporter obtains the audio from someone who was present and publishes it. The council member says, "That isn't me. Anyone can make a voice clip with AI now."

Check it against the passage.

  • Is the recording genuine? Yes. That matches "things that are in fact true."
  • Is the lie a denial? Yes. Nothing fictional is being asserted to have occurred.
  • Does the denial lean on public awareness of fakes? Yes. "Anyone can make a voice clip with AI now" is an appeal to what the audience already believes about the technology.
  • Did anyone make a fake? No.

All four answers fit. The case would be a use of the liar's dividend whether or not the denial succeeds. How well it works depends on what else supports the recording: the witness, the reporter's account of how the audio was obtained, and whether the original file can be examined.

Key Considerations

The article dates from 2019. It predates the tools that now generate images, voices, and video from a typed description, and it was written about video and audio. The authors were reasoning about where the technology would lead. The term has since been applied to images and text, which goes beyond their wording while following their logic.

The subsection also places the dividend within a wider trend. The authors write that it "would run with the grain of larger trends involving truth skepticism," and they mention the use of "fake news" as a way to wave off damaging reports. They don't present it as an effect of technology alone.

The common mistake is to use "liar's dividend" for any harm a deepfake does. A fraud carried out with a faked video call is a deepfake harm, and a fabricated clip of a candidate is a deepfake harm. Neither is the liar's dividend, because in both a fake is made and believed. The term applies only when real evidence is denied.

A second point to keep straight is that the passage is an argument. It offers reasoning and no measurements. Quoting it establishes what the term means. It doesn't establish how often such denials succeed.

Summary

The passage defines a harm that needs no fake: a liar's gain from the public's knowledge that fakes are possible. A plain-language definition, with one case that fits and one that doesn't:

The liar's dividend is the advantage a person gains by calling genuine evidence fake, at a time when the public knows convincing fakes can be made. It grows as public awareness of fakes grows, and it doesn't require that any fake be made or believed.

Fits: An official recorded making a real promise to a donor says the audio was generated by AI, and some listeners accept the denial because they know such audio can be made.

Doesn't fit: An employee sends money after a video call with fraudsters who used a fabricated image and voice of his manager. A fake was made and believed, so this is fraud by impersonation.

References

  • Chesney, Bobby, and Danielle Citron. 2019. "Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National Security." California Law Review 107: 1753.

Report an issue with this item

Guided Conversation 12 min

Weigh a Claim About AI and Misinformation

In this conversation you'll take one claim you've heard about AI and misinformation and work out who it says is harmed, how that harm could be measured, and what evidence exists. You'll leave with the claim restated in your own words with its level of evidence attached.

You'll have this conversation with an AI assistant, using your own account. Choose a button to open a new chat with the prompt already filled in, then press send to start. If the chat opens empty, copy the prompt and paste it in.

Run this conversation in whichever assistant you already use:

Claude desktop app

To use another LLM, simply copy and paste the prompt into its chat window.

Show the full prompt (it lists misreadings to watch for, so skip it if you would rather come to the conversation fresh)
Guided Conversation: Weigh a Claim About AI and Misinformation (about 12 minutes)

Note to the learner: press send to start. Everything below is facilitator guidance for the AI. It lists misconceptions to watch for, so skip it if you'd rather come to the conversation fresh.

Please facilitate a reflective dialogue with me. I'm an adult with no technical background who has used AI chatbots for everyday tasks, and I'm studying how AI-generated content affects misinformation and public trust. Follow this guidance for the whole conversation.

GOAL
I can assess the evidence on how AI-generated content affects misinformation and public trust, using a claim I've heard myself.

HOW TO RUN THE CONVERSATION
- Ask one question at a time, then wait for my reply. Keep each of your turns under about 120 words.
- Don't lecture. Explain a point only when I need it to continue, then return to my claim.
- Be curious and collegial. Use plain words and define any technical term briefly on first use. Welcome disagreement when I give a reason.
- Plain conversation only: don't search the web or create files or documents.
- Aim for about 12 minutes. Spend most of the time on topics 1 and 2. If my replies are brief, offer one concrete prompt, such as "Have you seen a headline saying deepfakes are a threat to elections, or that the worry was overblown?" and move on. If I seem uncertain, shorten the conversation to 5-7 minutes. Always reach the final topic.
- Start now. Open with one or two warm sentences: this is a conversation, not a quiz; my reasoning matters more than knowing the research; I can ask you to clarify anything. Then ask me for one claim I've heard about AI and misinformation, from the news, a colleague, or social media.

TOPICS, IN ORDER
1. The claim. Ask who the claim says is harmed (a person, a firm, voters, the public's trust) and how that harm would be measured if someone tried. Draw out the difference between a harm with a victim and a record, and a harm spread across many people.
2. The evidence. Ask what evidence I think exists for that kind of harm. Then tell me what kind of study or record exists (a documented case, a review of an election, an argument from reasoning) and what its design can and can't show. Follow up once on what would change my mind.
3. The liar's dividend. Explain it in two sentences if I don't know it. Ask whether it applies to my claim, and what it would predict: that people believe fakes, or that they doubt real evidence.
4. Closing. Ask me to restate my claim in one or two sentences with its evidence level attached, such as "documented", "not shown", "argued but unmeasured", or "unknown". Tell me I can take it into a short optional journal entry.

KEY POINTS TO KEEP ACCURATE
- Fraud and impersonation using synthetic media are documented. In 2024 the engineering firm Arup lost about 25 million US dollars after an employee joined a video call with deepfaked colleagues. Sexual imagery made without consent is also documented. Counts of how often these happen rest largely on reported cases.
- Election outcomes: a 2024 review by a research center at The Alan Turing Institute found a lack of evidence that AI-enabled disinformation had a measurable impact on the US presidential result. It said this was mainly because data on real voter behavior is insufficient, and that AI content did shape discussion by amplifying other false claims.
- In 2023 three misinformation researchers argued the fears were overblown: demand for misinformation is limited, most people get news from mainstream sources, and better fakes add little. That was a forecast.
- Subtle, delayed, or local effects haven't been measured. Absence of evidence from weak measurement is not proof of no effect.
- The liar's dividend (Chesney and Citron, 2019): when the public knows fakes exist, a person can dismiss real evidence as fake. No fake needs to be made or believed. It is an argued mechanism, supported by cases, and its size hasn't been measured.
- Provenance tools and labels are partial: marks can be removed, unmarked content isn't thereby real, and adoption is incomplete.
- You may not know events after your training. If my claim concerns something recent, say you can't confirm it and reason about what evidence would be needed.

MISCONCEPTIONS TO CORRECT GENTLY
When one appears, name the accurate version briefly, then return to my claim.
- "AI swung the election": this hasn't been shown.
- "So misinformation worries are baseless": documented harms exist, and subtler effects are unmeasured.
- "Labels will solve it": labels can be removed, and a missing label proves nothing.
- "The liar's dividend means any deepfake harm": it means real evidence being dismissed as fake.

LIMITS
- Map the evidence and take no view on policy. If I ask what should be done, say you're mapping the evidence and return the question to me.
- Don't discuss how to make synthetic media.
- Make no claims about specific living people. If my claim names one, discuss the type of claim and not the person.
- Don't favor or disparage any company, including the one that built you.

TO FINISH
After my closing answer, close in one short turn:
- Affirm one specific thing I worked out, in my own words where possible.
- Suggest one or two next steps that fit how the conversation went. Possible steps: write a journal entry about a time I wasn't sure something online was real; look for the original source of one viral clip; ask a colleague how they decide what to believe online.
- Restate my claim on its own line, labeled "My claim, with its evidence level", so I can copy it.

Report an issue with this item

Journal 15 minOptional

How You Decide What's Real

Overview

You'll write about one moment when you weren't sure whether something online was real, and examine how you handled it. Looking at your own reasoning shows whether your doubt helped you find out what was true.

The entry is optional. It's for you, and nobody collects it.

Writing Prompt

Describe a recent moment when you weren't sure whether something online was real, and assess your own reasoning against the evidence on misinformation and the liar's dividend. Write 250–400 words.

Steps

  1. Describe the item and what made you unsure. It could be an image, a clip, a quotation, or a news story. Say where you saw it and what prompted the doubt: how it looked, who shared it, or what it claimed.
  2. Say what you did to check, if anything. Be exact. "I searched for the original source" and "I scrolled past and assumed it was fake" are both honest answers. If you did nothing, say so.
  3. Ask whether your doubt was warranted or an instance of the liar's dividend. The liar's dividend is the advantage a person gains by calling genuine evidence fake, at a time when the public knows convincing fakes can be made. Consider whether you had a reason to doubt this item in particular, or whether you doubted it only because fakes exist.
  4. State one habit you'd keep or change. Make it something you could do next time, such as looking for where a clip first appeared before deciding. You can draw on any notes of your own.

Self-Check

Before you finish, check that your entry:

  • Describes one specific case
  • Says what you did to check, or that you did nothing
  • Applies the liar's dividend to your own reaction
  • Names one habit you'd keep or change

Nothing is uploaded. Write in your own notebook or document and keep it.

Report an issue with this item

Knowledge Check 10 min

Synthetic media, misinformation, and trust

This ungraded knowledge check assesses your understanding of what the evidence shows about AI-generated content, misinformation, and trust. You'll be asked about documented harms from synthetic media, the evidence on elections, the liar's dividend, and provenance and labeling.

Note: Use this to test yourself, review the feedback on any questions you miss, and retry until you feel confident before moving forward.

5 questions · ungraded · retry as often as you like

Report an issue with this item